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CLINTON, KOSOVO, AND THE FINAL DESTRUCTION OF
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

MAJOR GEOFFREY S. CORN*

In February of 1999, as the rhetoric of possible United States use
of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to reach
a crescendo, Congressman Tom Campbell and thirty-eight other
members of Congress sent the following letter to President Clinton:
February 19, 1999
Honorable William Jefferson Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
We have serious constitutional concerns about recent
reports that you are planning military intervention in the
Kosovo region of Yugoslavia, and again respectfully
remind you that the Constitution requires you to obtain
* Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army. Presently enrolled in the
United States Army Command and General StaffCollege. LL.M. (Distinguished Graduate),
The Judge Advocates General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1997; J.D. with Highest
Honors, National Law Center of George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1992;
B.A., Hartwick College, Oneonta, New York, 1983. Formerly assigned as Chief of Criminal
Law, Senior Trial Counsel, and Legal Assistance Officer, Office ofthe StaffJudge Advocate,
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 19931996; Funded Legal Education Program, 1989-1992; Future Readiness Officer, Military
Intelligence Branch, U.S. Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia, 1989; S-2, 1st
Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Kobbe, Panama, 1987-1988; Assistant
S-2,193d InfantryBrigade (Task Force Bayonet), Fort Clayton, Panama, 1986-1987; Platoon
Leader, 29th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Clayton, Panama, 1986; Briefing Officer,
G-2, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama), Fort Clayton, Panama, 1985-1986.
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authority from Congress before taking military action
against Yugoslavia.
As we stated in our letters of August 4, and October 2,
1998, military intervention by U.S. forces into the wartorn region of Kosovo in order to stop attacks by Serbian
forces against civilians and halt the fighting with the
Kosovo Liberation Army in an area the United States
recognizes as sovereign Yugoslav territory cannot be
construed as "defensive" action within your inherent
authority as Commander-in-Chief. Rather it would
involve military actions against territory and air space
which has not been the source of an attack on the United
States. This action falls within the exclusive powers and
responsibilities of Congress under Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution-the war powers clause. No provision of
the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty
can override the requirement of United States domestic
law as set forth in the Constitution. In fact, Congress
conditioned U.S. participation in both the U.N. and NATO
on the requirement that Congress retain its constitutional
prerogatives.
The Constitution compels you to obtain authority from
Congress before taking military action against
Yugoslavia. In earlier correspondence, dated January 15,
1999, your National Security Advisor cited previous uses
of force in Bosnia and Somalia as examples of authority to
conduct offensive military operations in this case. The
examples are inapposite as none involve sending military
forces into a foreign country's territory contrary to the will
of the recognized government of that foreign country.
Furthermore, past violations of constitutional duty form
no justification for additional violations. Nor does
,consulting with a few Members of Congress satisfy the
constitutional obligation to obtain the approval of
Congress.1
With this proverbial "shot across the bow," Representative
Campbell set the stage for what he probably believed would be a
monumental constitutional showdown over the authority of the
1. Letter from Representative Tom Campbell and other Members of Congress to
President Clinton, at http://www.house.gov/campbel/990219.htm (Feb. 19, 1999).
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President to. commit the armed forces of the United States to
combat. What actually transpired was far less sensational than
such a showdown would have been. Yet, although little public or
press attention was paid to the constitutional debate surrounding
OperationAllied Force-the combat operations directed against the
Federal Republic ofYugoslavia 2 -Representative Campbell's action,
and the political and legal response to it, had a potentially profound
impact on the law related to the domestic legal authority to commit
United States armed forces to combat. Specifically, while this action
may or may not have brought about the downfall of the regime of
Slobodan Milosevic, it may have provided the ammunition to bring
about the final demise of the quarter-century old, oft-avoided, and
generally misunderstood War Powers Resolution.
Over twenty-five years ago, the Congress of the United States
passed, over the veto of then President Richard Nixon,3 a joint
resolution which was intended to restore the proper balance
between the executive and legislative branches with regard to the
decision to send United States forces into combat.4 This law, which
was codified as part of the United States Code, came to be known
as the War Powers Resolution.5 Since the date it came into force,
the armed forces of the United States have conducted combat
operations all over the world, ranging from the armed escort of
foreign-flagged merchant ships reflagged with the U.S. colors for
the purpose of gaining U.S. military protection, to massive air and
ground operations against conventional enemy forces. 6 Looking
2. This was the designation for the air and missile attacks launched by the United
States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against the Federal
Republic ofYugoslavia on March 24,1999. See Campbellv. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,20 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (containing factual discussion of Operation Allied Force), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 50
(2000).
3. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, 5 PUB. PAPERS 893 (Oct. 24, 1973).
4. The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-248, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994)). The War Powers Resolution indicates: "It is the purpose ofthis
chapter to fulfill the intent of the framers ofthe Constitution of the United States and insure
that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities ... "50 U.S.C. § 1541(a).
5. See 50 U.S.C. ch. 33 (1994); Pub. L. No. 93-248, § 1, 87 Stat. at 555.
6. See generaUyLOUISFIsHER,PRESIDENTIAL WARPOWER134-61(1995) (catalogingthe
instances of military force used by Presidents under their unilateral power as Commander
in Chief in the administrations from President Ford to President Clinton); Jane E.
Stromseth, Collective Force and ConstitutionalResponsibility: WarPowers in the Post-Cold
WarEra,50 U.MIAMIL. REV. 145 (1995) thereinafter Stromseth, CollectiveForce](discussing
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back over this period, it is indisputable that the central component
of the War Powers Resolution-the requirement that the President
obtain express congressional authorization to conduct such operations 7 -has been virtually meaningless.8 In fact, it is probably
only a slight exaggeration to state that the most significant effect
of the War Powers Resolution has been to provide separation of
powers scholars with an interesting subject to analyze and debate.
Analysis of the actual operation of the Resolution in relation to
these various combat operations reveals a consistent pattern of
executive side-stepping, 9 legislative acquiescence, 0 and judicial
abstention." Many scholars have criticized this pattern of
"nullifying" the intent of the Resolution.12 However, few have
the influence of actions taken under the United Nations Charter); Jane E. Stromseth,
UnderstandingConstitutionalWar PowersToday: Why MethodologyMatters, 106 YALE L.J.
845, 865-86 (1996) [hereinafter Stromseth, War Powers Today] (reviewing FISHER, supra).
For a factual discussion of Operation Allied Force, see Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20.
7. See 50 U.S.C. at § 1541(c). This section states:
The constitutional powers ofthe President as Commander-in-Chiefto introduce
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are
exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
Id.
8. See Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say
Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1-6, 10-12 (1998) (arguing instead that "[the Resolution...
grants to the President unbridled discretion to go to war as he deems necessary against
anyone, anytime, anywhere, for at least ninety days").
9. See FISHER, supranote 6, at 134-61; Michael Ratner & David Cole, The ForceofLaw:
JudicialEnforcementof the War PowersResolution, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 742-50 (1984);
Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congressand the President Under the War Powers
Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 87-95 (1984).
10. See Michael J. Glennon, Too FarApart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 17, 28-31 (1995); Vance, supra note 9, at 87-95.
11. See Ratner & Cole, supranote 9, at 751-61.
12. See, e.g., ChristopherA. Ford, WarPowersAsWe Live Them: Congressional-Executive
BargainingUnder the Shadow of the War Powers Resolution, 11 J.L. & POL. 609, 700-08
(1995); Glennon, supra note 10, passim;Allan Ides, Congress, ConstitutionalResponsibility
and the War Power,17 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 599,631-52 (1984); Ratner & Cole, supra note 9, at
742-50; Rep. Clement J. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future
Promise,17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 579passim (1984); Bennett C. Rushkoff, Note,A Defense of the
War Powers Resolution, 93 Yale L.J. 1330, 1332-33 (1984); Brian M. Spaid, Comment,
Collective Security v. ConstitutionalSovereignty: Can the President Commit U.S. Troops
UndertheSanction ofthe UnitedNationsSecurity CouncilWithout CongressionalApproval?,
17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1055, 1078-88 (1992).
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analyzed the impact of this pattern on the constitutional validity of
the Resolution. As a result of the most recent use of combat force by
the United States, Operation Allied Force, this analysis can no
longer be avoided.
Opponents of the War Powers Resolution have always insisted
that it represented an unconstitutional intrusion into the power of
the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief. 3
Indeed, this was the prime factor leading to President Nixon's veto
of the Resolution." Up until 1999, however, proponents of the
constitutional validity of the Resolution could generally muster two
theories to explain why they continued to persist in their views,
despite the pattern of executive nulification. The first reason was
essentially that repeated presidential abuse of the law did not
undermine its validity-that an illegal presidential practice cannot,
by virtue of repetition, be transformed into a legal one. 5 The
13. See Lieutenant Commander John W. Rolph, The Decline and Fallof the War Powers
Resolution:WagingWar Underthe ConstitutionAfterDesertStorm, 40 NAvALL. REv. 85,9193 (1992); Robert F. Turner, The WarPowersResolution:Unconstitutional,Unnecessary,and
Unhelpful, 17 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 683, 683-85 (1984).
14.
I hereby return without my approval House Joint Resolution 542-the War
Powers Resolution. While I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to
assert its proper role in the conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which
this resolution would impose upon the authority of the President are both
unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.
Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 3.
15. See HAROLD JONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURrrY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER

AFERTHE IRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR 133 (1990); Ratner& Cole, supranote 9, at 742-66; Zablocki,
supra note 12, at 597-98. According to one scholar:
It has been argued that congressional acquiescence in the practice ofexecutive
war making has constitutionally legitimized the model of presidential
predominance. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, PresidentiatWar-Making, 50
B.U.L. REV. (Special Issue) 19 (1970). If this theory is correct, then it can only
mean that an unconstitutional practice long endured amends the Constitution
for we are not here dealing with anything that can be legitimately described as
a grey area. The theory is without merit. Article V of the Constitution provides
a method of amendment and so long as that method is not used, the
Constitution remains unaltered regardless of any pattern of behavior
undertaken by the President, the Congress or the Supreme Court. There is no
doctrine of amendment by violation. Patterns of unconstitutional behavior call
for one response- repudiation.
Ides, supranote 12, at 626 n.92. Indeed, the Letter from Representative Campbell noted this
point when it indicated that the repetition of an unconstitutional act does not render it
constitutional. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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second, and perhaps more persuasive, reason was that the
Resolution had never conclusively been violated by a President.1 6
This conclusion is reached by combining two propositions. First,
that contrary to the express meaning of the Resolution, the "60 day
clock"'7 provision has served as a de facto source of authority for
Presidents to employ force. 8 Second, that no combat operation
initiated by a President during this period extended beyond sixty
days without express congressional authorization, thus satisfying
the requirements of the Resolution.' 9
As this Article will demonstrate, contrary to the arguments of
proponents of the continued validity of the Resolution, Operation
Allied Force left an indelible mark on the history of war making
under the Resolution. Operation Allied Force was the first combat
operation to continue beyond sixty days without express statutory
authorization, in apparent contravention of the War Powers
Resolution.2' Thus, it is an action that must be analyzed to assess
whether the arguments surrounding the Resolution remain
legitimate.
This Article proposes that analysis of the history of war making,
with particular emphasis on Operation Allied Force and the war
powers litigation it generated, establishes that the War Powers
Resolution's requirement that the President conduct nondefensive

16. See, e.g., Fisher & Adler, supranote 8, at 10-12.
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994).
18. See Fisher & Adler, supra note 8, at 11.
19. See Stromseth, Collective Force, supra note 6, at 165-66; Stromseth, War Powers
Today, supranote 6, at 910-11.
20. On March 24, 1999, President Clinton announced the commencement of NATO
strikes against Yugoslav targets, and on April 28, the President submitted to Congress a
report, "consistent with the War Powers Resolution," detailing his decision. See Campbell v.
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Under the War Powers Resolution:
Within sixty calendardays after a report is submitted ...
the President shall
terminate any use of United States Armed Forces... unless Congress (1) has
declared war or has enacted specific authorizationfor such use of United States
Armed Forces,(2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3)is physically
unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994) (emphasis added). On April 28, Congress voted down a declaration
ofwar and an "authorization" of the air strikes, but also voted against a resolution requiring
the President to immediately cease U.S. participation in the air strikes, and voted to fumd
the operation. See Campbell, 203 F.3d at 20. The conflict continued for 79 days, ending on
June 10. See id.
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combat operations 21 pursuant only to express legislative
authorization 22 isunconstitutional. This conclusion, however, will
not be based on the traditional theory that the Resolution
impermissibly intrudes upon the exclusive power of the executive
to initiate combat operations. In fact, it is premised on an
interpretation of the Constitution that the power to initiate
nondefensive combat operations is not an exclusive executive power,
but a power shared between the executive and legislative
branches.' This interpretation is reinforced by "historical gloss,"
and in light of Operation Allied Force, conclusively establishes that
how the Congress and the President choose to cooperate in the
exercise of this shared power is their choice. Thus, the requirement
in the War Powers Resolution that only express legislative consent
serve as constitutionally legitimate authorization for presidential
combat initiatives2 5 is an unconstitutional restriction on how future
Congresses choose to manifest support for the President, and on

21. This Article does not address the legal authority for the President to order the
conduct of "defensive" or "responsive" war. While an exact definition of such a term is
difficult to provide, there is ample historical and judicial support for the conclusion that the
President has unilateral constitutional authority to respond to an attack on the United
States or its armed forces. See Major Geoffrey S. Corn, PresidentialWar Power: Do the
Courts Offer Any Answers?, 157 MiL. L. REv. 180, 212-15 (1998) [hereinafter Corn,
PresidentialWar Power] (analyzing the impact of the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1862), on the authority ofthe President to respond to enemy attack); see also Campbell, 203
F.3d at 25-27 (Silberman, J., concurring) (discussing the relevance of the Prize Cases when
analyzing the authority of the President to respond to situations of hostilities).
Instead, this Article focuses on military operations that cannot legitimately be classified
as falling into the realm of"responsive" or "defensive" war. Such operations are characterized
by the initiation of hostilities by the United States against an opponent who cannot be
perceived as planning an imminent attack against the United States or its armed forces, as
in the case of Operation Allied Force. It is important to note that this is a distinction that is
central to the War Powers Resolution, which acknowledges that the President is
constitutionally authorized to order the armed forces of the United States into combat "only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces." 50 U.S.C. §1541(c) (1994). Thus, it is only the issue of conflict outside this
category that leads to controversy under the War Powers Resolution.
22. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).
23. See Corn, PresidentialWar Power, supra note 21, at 182-86 (analyzing the shared
authority theory of war power).
24. See infranotes 27-80 and accompanying text.
25. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541(c), 1547(a)(1).
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what future Presidents can constitutionally rely upon to conclude
that their initiatives are cooperative ventures.
Part I of the Article will briefly review the concept of historical
gloss. in separation of powers analysis. The second part will
highlight some significant pre-Resolution examples of the historical
practice of flexible cooperation. Part III will illustrate tie profound
limitation placed on this flexibility by the War Powers Resolution.
The fourth part will illustrate that post-Resolution practice
continued to validate this historical practice, with particular
emphasis on Operation Allied Force. Part V will analyze the
constitutional significance of this practice. The conclusion will
analyze the significant distinction between determining unconstitutionality based on this theory versus a theory of intrusion upon
an exclusive executive power.
PART I: THE NATURE OF "HISTORICAL GLOSS"
In April of 1952, during the height of the conflict in Korea,
President Truman issued an executive order 7 that triggered a
landmark decision in the field of separation of powers and national
security law.' His order to seize steel mills in the wake of a steel
workers' strike, motivated by his desire to ensure the continued
supply of arms and ammunition to U.S. forces engaged in conflict,2 9
26. See generally Corn, PresidentialWar Power, supra note 21 (analyzingthe constitutional significance of cooperative war-making decisions).
27. See Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 861-62 (1949-1953) (directing the Secretary of
Commerce to take possession of and operate the plants and facilities of certain steel
companies).
28. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also KOH,
supranote 15, at 105-13 (discussing Youngstown).
29. According to the executive order.
WHEREAS the weapons and othermaterials needed by our armed forces and
by those joined with us in the defense ofthe free world are produced to a great
extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially
all of such weapons and materials; and
WHEREAS a continuing and uninterrupted supply ofsteel is also indispensable
to the maintenance of the economy of the United States, upon which our
military strength depends; and
WHEREAS in order to assure the continued availability of steel and steel
products during the existing emergency, it is necessary that the United States
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led to the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.3" The
Supreme Court struck down the executive order, rejecting an
emergency executive power argument.31 Four separate concurring
opinions accompanied the opinion of the Court. Two of these
concurring opinions, delivered by Justices Frankfurter 2 and
Jackson,"3 have gained great prominence as models for national
security analysis.3 4 Although both of these opinions enunciated a
flexible framework for analyzing national security powers, Justice
Frankfurter provided the analytical model for considering the
impact5 of past practice to determine constitutional authority in this
3
area.

Justice Frankfurter began his opinion by emphasizing the critical
importance of checks and balances 'in the function of our
constitutional system:
Before the cares of the White House were his own, President
Harding is reported to have said that government afier all is a

very simple thing. He must have said that, if he said it, as a
fleeting inhabitant of fairyland. The opposite is the truth. A
constitutional democracy like ours is perhaps the most difficult
of man's social arrangements to manage successfully. Our
scheme of society is more dependent than any other form of
government on knowledge and wisdom and self-discipline for
the achievement of its aims. For our democracy implies the
reign of reason on the most extensive scale....

To that end [the Founders of our Nation] rested the structure
of our central government on the system of checks and balances.
For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere
theory; it was a felt necessity.36

take possession of and operate the plants, facilities, and other property of said
companies as hereinafter provided.
Exec. Order No. 10,340, 3 C.F.R. 861-62 (1949-1953).
30. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
31. See id. at 587-89.
32. See id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
34. See, e.g., KOH, supranote 15, at 105-13.

35. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also KOH, supra
note 15, at 70-72; Corn, PresidentialWar Power,supra note 21, at 240-41.

36. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Justice Frankfurter then rejected the stoic model of judicial
analysis enunciated by Justice Black in the opinion of the Court.
Instead, he emphasized the importance of viewing the Constitution
as a "framework" for the exercise of government power, particularly
when the power under scrutiny is not textually committed to a
specific branch of the government.38 According to Justice
Frankfurter: "It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and
to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them." 9 In this
sentence, Justice Frankfurter signaled the importance of looking to
past practice as a guide to judicial interpretation. The essence of his
theory was that a long-standing practice of the government
concerning a given power is evidence of how the drafters of the
Constitution intended the power to be exercised. Accordingly, he
indicated that:
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give
meaning to the words of a text or supply them.... In short, a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making it as it were such exercise of power part
of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on
"executive Power" vested in the President by §1 of Art. 11.40

This theory of constitutional power is based on two critical
factors. First, past practice is relevant not just because it occurred,
but because the political branches of the government which
initiated or acquiesced to the exercise of such power both shared the
obligation to interpret the Constitution.4 Second, the "test" for
when such practice establishes the existence of constitutional power

37. See id. at 585-89.

38. See id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
39. Id.

40. Id. at 610-11.
41. See id. at 610-11, 614 ("In reaching the conclusion that conscience compels, I too
derive consolation from the reflection that the President and the Congress between them will
continue to safeguard the heritage which comes to them straight from George Washington.").
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must be exacting, because the issue at stake will be the meaning of
the Constitution.'
The test Justice Frankfurter expounded contained several critical
elements. First, the practice had to be "systematic, unbroken...
[and] long pursued" by the executive." Thus, isolated incidents or
recent trends are insufficient to support the conclusion that' the
exercise of power is constitutionally based. Second,, Congress must
have notice of the long-standing practice.4 ' This is essential because
a conclusion that an executive exercise of power is based on the
Constitution has the potential consequence of disabling the
Congress from participating in such exercise. Thus, past practice of
executive power must reflect not only an executive belief that the
power belonged to that branch, but legislative acceptance of that
belief, which can only exist if Congress had notice of the practice.4 5
The final component, linked to the "notice" element, is that the
practice must not have been questioned or challenged by the
legislature. 4'6 This is because evidence of such a challenge is
evidence that past Congresses did not share in the view that the
exercise was constitutional.
According to Justice Frankfurter, satisfaction of this test would
have a profound consequence: it would make "as it were such
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, [and]
may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the
President by § 1 of Art. II."' 7 Thus, it would constitutionally validate
the exercise of power by the President. Unfortunately for President
Truman, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the test had not been
satisfied with regard to emergency seizure power.4 8 The
comprehensive extent of his analysis is, however, informative of
how detailed such analysis must be. Before reaching his conclusion,
Justice Frankfurter scrutinized every past industry seizure,
42. See id. at 610 ("[Tjhey give meaning to the words of a text or supply them.").

43. Id
44. See id. (referring to practices "long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress").
45. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,474 (1915) ("[A] long-continued
practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the
[action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent....").
46. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (referring to practices
"never before questioned").
47. Id. at 610-11.
48. See id. at 614.

1160

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1149

focusing on the statutory authority, duration, terms, and
compensation related thereto.4 9 His research was laid out in an
appendix spanning thirteen pages and is a visual reminder that
application of this test must be exacting. 50
Justice Frankfurter's "historical gloss" theory of constitutional
interpretation dovetails with Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
in Youngstown. Jackson proposed a spectrum of possible executive/
congressional conflict. On one extreme, the President may act
concurrent with an express or implied congressional authorization,
in which case his actions will only be rejected by the Court if
specifically prohibited by the Constitution.5 1 On the other extreme,
the President may act contrary to an express or implied
congressional directive. In these instances, the President must
have exclusive constitutional authority in order for his action to be
legitimate.5 2 In between these two extremes, however, is a "zone of
twilight" where Congress may not have spoken authoritatively on
the matter." In such instances, "congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility."'
Accordingly, where Congress has notice and does not object to a
consistent executive practice, both Justices Jackson and
Frankfurter would recognize that practice as constitutional.
Justice Frankfurter's theory of constitutional analysis took on
new life when it was relied on heavily in Dames & Moore v. Regan.5 5
In Dames & Moore, Justice Rehnquist upheld President Carter's
suspension of private claims against Iran as a valid exercise of
executive power under the Constitution.5 6 Although this power was
49. See id. at 615-28.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 635-637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
52. See id. at 637-38. Jackson cited the"exclusive power ofremovalin executive agencies"
as an example of Executive power which cannot be limited by congressional act. See id. at
638 n.4 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
53. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
56. Id. at 686. The dispute arose out of the hostage crisis following the seizure of the
American embassy in Tehran during the 1979 revolution in Iran. See id. at 662. In 1981, the
Americans held hostage were released by Iran pursuant to an agreement under which the
United States and Iran agreed"to terminate alllitigation as between the Government of each
party and the nationals of the other." Id. at 664-65. Implementation of this agreement
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not textually committed to the executive, Justice Rehnquist relied
on the historical gloss theory to support his conclusion. 57 Looking to
past incidents of executive claims suspension, Justice Rehnquist
noted that Congress had never challenged the exercise of such
power and therefore approved it. 5" He bolstered this argument with
a review of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act"
and the Hostage Act,60 which did not prohibit such executive action,
but instead legislated around it, thus inviting the exercise of the
power in question.6 '
In upholding the suspension of claims, therefore, the Court
focused on two factors: first, the history of congressional
acquiescence to such presidential claims settlements;6 2 and second,
"the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the
President's authority in a particular case which evinces legislative
intent to accord the President broad discretion [and therefore] may
be considered to 'invite' 'measures of independent presidential
responsibility."'63 Such "closely related" legislation was, according
to the Court, significant more for what it did not say than what it
did say: "At least this is so where there is no contrary indication of
legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of
congressional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the
President." 4 In other words, this "closely related" legislation
indicated that the President did not act contrary to the express will
of Congress, and therefore made the history of acquiescence to
executive claims settlement determinative. Only after identifying
a long history of such congressional acquiescence did the Court hold
the President acted pursuant to his inherent constitutional
authority.6 Although the Court's analysis did not attempt the
suspended all private claims and judgments against Iranian assets, see d. at 665-66,
including a judgment entered for Dames & Moore against Iran for payment due under a
contract between the two, see id. at 663-64.
57. See id (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).

58. See id. at 678-83, 686-88.
59. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994).
60. 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1994).

61. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 675-87.
62. See id. at 680-82.
63. Id. at 678 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
64. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79.
65. See id. at 679-80 (tracing"a longstandingpractice ofsettling such claims by executive
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comprehensiveness of Justice Frankfurter's appendix,6 6 Dames &
Moore nonetheless significantly added to the influence of the
historical gloss theory.
As Part V of this Article will demonstrate, this theory of constitutional analysis provides a solid foundation for the proposition
that the President is entitled to rely upon the implicit support of
Congress to conclude that the initiation and continuation of combat
operations in a given case is constitutionally valid. For this
proposition to be valid, however, it is necessary to address the
impact of historical gloss on the text of the Constitution. Does such
a gloss modify the text of the Constitution, or does it illuminate the
original meaning of the Constitution? This question is critical in the
context of war power, because if it is simply a "customary"
modification,6" subsequent legislation, here in the form of the War
Powers Resolution, should trump this custom. If the impact of such
a gloss is to illuminate the original meaning of the Constitution,
however, then the attempt to modify such meaning through
legislation should be impermissible. This seems especially true
when the legislation is passed over the veto of the President.
One of the most prominent scholars in the area of national
security law, Professor Harold Koh, asserts the position that the
"gloss" created by history is not illumination of the Constitution,
but customary modification, and thus susceptible to legislative
retraction. 69 Thus, in his book The NationalSecurity Constitution,
he describes Justice Frankfurter's theory as tantamount to
"customary constitutional law."" As such, he places its significance
at the lowest level of the model for national security analysis that
Justice Jackson announced in Youngstown,7 and indicates that:
Although this large body of quasi-constitutional custom fills in
the interstices of the textual and statutory skeleton of the
National Security Constitution, it is perennially subject to
revision. In the same way as nations modify customary rules of
agreement").
66. See supratext accompanying note 50.
67. See infra notes 161-75 and accompanying text.
68. See KOH, supra note 15, at 70-72.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See supranotes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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international law by establishing more formal rules in a
particular area by treaty, so too can Congress and the president
override quasi-constitutional custom by enacting a framework
statute or issuing a framework executive order, which can in
turn be invalidated or modified by a formal constitutional
amendment or judicial decision construing the Constitution.72
In my view, Professor Koh's explanation of the impact of
historical gloss misconstrues Justice Frankfurter's opinion. This
conclusion is based on two factors. First, Justice Frankfurter was
clearly analyzing the existence of a constitutional executive power,
not whether the executive and the legislature had agreed to provide
for such a power. This point was emphasized early in his opinion
when he indicated that "our first inquiry must be not into the
powers of the President, but into the powers of a District Judge to
issue a temporary injunction . . ." With this caveat, Justice
Frankfurter clearly indicated that once this initial inquiry was
resolved, the ultimate issue of the case entailed analysis of the
President's constitutional power. The opinion further emphasized
this point when Justice Frankfurter stated: "The Constitution is a
framework for government. Therefore, the way the framework has
consistently operated fairly establishes that it has operated
7 4 Frankfurter
according to its true nature."
insisted that if the
requisite "systematic, unbroken" practice is established, it "may be
treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by §1
of Art. II." 7' Justice Frankfurter was therefore endeavoring to
determine the authority vested in the President by the
Constitution.
Second, Justice Frankfurter's predicate, that the value of a past
practice derives from the shared responsibility of the branches
engaged in it to interpret the Constitution," indicates that his focus
was the meaning of the Constitution, and not the mere agreement
to lodge power in a particular branch. This supports the conclusion
that a finding of historical gloss is an enunciation of the meaning of
72. Id at 71.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 595 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
74. Id, at 610 (emphasis added).
75. Id, at 610-11.
76. See supranote 41 and accompanying text.'
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the Constitution. As such, modification by mere legislation would
be invalid, even if both branches consent to the modification.
To take Professor Koh's analogy to international law one step
further, Justice Frankfurter's historical gloss analysis should be
equated not to mere customary international law, but to a normjus
cogens-anonderogable principle of customary international law."
Therefore, just as ajus cogens principle may only be modified by a
subsequent customary international law principle of the same
character,7 8 and not by agreement of the interested parties," a
power derived from historical gloss may only be modified by a
subsequent constitutional modification, and not by legislation.
Even conceding that Professor Koh is correct in his analysis of
the significance of historical gloss, his own enunciation of how such
past practice is modified seems to suggest that the War Powers
Resolution is invalid. According to Koh, post-practice modification
requires the consent of both the legislative and executive
branches.8 Indeed, in equating the modification to a modification
of customary international law through the treaty process,
Professor Koh concedes the critical nature of the consent of all
parties involved in the proposed modification. Thus, even under
Koh's description, President Nixon's veto of the War Powers
Resolution invalidates the Resolution as an effective modifier to any
historical gloss related to the exercise of war power. As will be
illustrated in Part V, this conclusion is essential to the analysis of
historical gloss on presidential war power.

77. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States defines ajus cogens
principle of customary international law as follows:
Some rules of international law are recognized by the international community
of states as peremptory, permittingno derogation. These rules prevail over and
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in
conflict with them. Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by
a subsequent norm of international law having the same character.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k

(1987).
78. See id.
79. See id. § 331(2Xb). Thus, the concept of jus cogens is identified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties as a bar to the subject matter of a treaty. May 23, 1969,
art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
80. See supra text accompanying note 72.
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PART H: FLEXIBILITY: THE KEY TO CONSTITUTIONAL WAR POWER
DECISIONS

The decision to send U.S. armed forces into combat includes a
multitude of policy considerations. From a legal perspective,
however, there are really only two issues: the international and
domestic legal basis for the operation.8 ' Although the international
legal aspects of decisions to use force have been most prominent in
recent operations, 2 this has not always been the case. Indeed, from
the earliest days of our nation, the issue of domestic legal authority
for launching combat operations has been addressed by courts,
scholars, media, and the political branches of our government."
This history of debate regarding the exercise of war power under
domestic law also provides a fertile landscape of military operations
to review for the purpose of analyzing the "constitutional custom"
related to war power. One of the first comprehensive studies of the
legal history of U.S. military action was conducted by the State
Department in 1966 in support of the Vietnam War, a project that
has continued since.8 4 Virtually every historical analysis, however,
has attempted to support or challenge assertions of unilateral
executive authority to initiate combat operations." Indeed,
81. See INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEPT, US. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK ch.

1 (2001), http'J/www.jagcnet.army.mil/TJA65A.
82. See, e.g., Richard G. Maxon, Nature'sEldest Law:A Survey ofaNation'sRightto Act
in Self-Defense, PARAMETERS, Autumn 1995, at 55; Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the
United States Action in Panama,29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1991).
83. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFrERMATH (1993); KOH, supra note 15; Corn, PresidentialWar Power,
supra note 21.
84. See Leonard C. Meeker, The Legality of United StatesParticipationin the Defense of
Viet Nam, 54 DEPT ST. BULL. 474 (1966), reprintedin 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1966) (citing
"at least 125 instances in which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action
or maintain positions abroad without obtaining prior Congressional authorization);
Monaghan, supranote 15, at 25-31 (discussing the Meeker article and asserting that "[tihe
occasions on which presidents have refused to take military action abroad because ofa lack
of prior congressional authorization are few in number and increasingly rare"). But see
FRANcIs D. WOnMU=H & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR, 133-34, 142-49 (2d
ed. 1986) (discussing the historical support for Meeker and Monaghan's arguments and
concluding that"[uin the case of executive wars, none of the conditions for the establishment
of constitutional power by usage is present").
85. See generally SENATE COMMITrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS.,

DOCUMENTs RELATING TO THE VAR POWER OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY AS
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE WAR IN INDOCHINA (Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter
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Presidents themselves have routinely cited this history in support
of a unilateral offensive war power.8 6 However, to my knowledge,
there has been no attempt to rely upon this same history for the
proposition that although the power of the President to initiate
combat operations is not unilateral, that power may be legally
exercised based on the implied consent of Congress."
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR POWER] (discussing this history in the context of the

proper roles of both the President and Congress in the conflict in Vietnam).
86. During the prelude to the Persian Gulf War, President Bush, during a press
conference on January 9, 1991, was asked if he would go to war if Congress failed to
authorize offensive operations. In response to this question, he stated: "I don't think I need
it .... Secretary Cheney expressed it very well the other day. There are a lot of differences
ofopinion on either side. But Saddam Hussein should be under no illusions. I believe I have
the constitutionalauthority-manyattorneyshaving so advisedme." Glennon, supra note 10,
at 21 n.18 (quoting Excerpts: The GreatDebate on WarPowers, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1991, at
26) (emphasis added); see also Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes
Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 35
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 527-28 (Mar. 26, 1999) [hereinafter Letter to Congressional
Leaders] (indicating that the attack was ordered "pursuant to [the President's] constitutional
authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and as Commander in Chief and Chief
Executive"). According to Professor Stromseth:
Presidents and their advisers regularly invoke historical practice as a means
of validating presidential power to commit U.S. forces to hostilities. Before the
Persian Gulf War, for instance, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney appealed to
history in arguing that President Bush did not need congressional approval to
send American troops into battle against Iraq: "[Iln the more than 200 times
that U.S. military force has been committed over the history of the Nation,
there are only five occasions in which the Congress of the United States voted
a prior declaration of war." Likewise, scholars who contend that the President
has broad unilateral authority to commit U.S. forces to combat appeal to the
pattern of history.
Stromseth, War Powers Today, supra note 6, at 872-86 (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
87. Ironically, it is this practice of presidential reliance on the implicit support of the
Congress and not unilateral presidential war making, that is supported by history. See Corn,
Presidential War Power, supra note 21, at 251-55; see also LEON FRIEDMAN & BURT
NEUBORNE, UNQUESTIONING OBEDIENCE TO THE PRESIDENT: THE ACLU CASE AGAINST THE
ILLEGAL WAR IN VIETNAM (1972). An example of the significance of a finding of implied

consent is provided by an excerpt from a decision related to the legality ofthe Vietnam War.
It is urged that evidence can be produced to demonstrate, in effect, that a
steady course of executive usurpation of initiatives that, constitutionally,
require the coaction of the Congress and the Executive has rendered the
Congress impotent to withhold the grudging and involuntary appropriations
and implementing laws relied on as constituting its authorization of combat
activities in Southeast Asia. But extended argument has brought out that the
reference is to the now-familiar compilations and analyses of the combat
occasions of the past coupled with proffered testimony of members of Congress
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In a 1998 article,8 8 I illustrated how an analysis of judicial
decisions related to war power leads to two critical conclusions. The
first is that there is no historical gloss which empowers the
President to initiate combat operations based on unilateral
executive authority, because the Constitution mandates a
congressional role in such a decision.89 The second conclusion is that
this same history demonstrates that although Congress must
support such an initiative, the support need not be express.90 Thus,
the President is permitted to rely upon the implied support of
Congress to conclude that a war-making initiative is constitutionally sound.9 1 While I do not intend to regurgitate every case
that their supportive votes were coerced by the predicament in which
unauthorized executive action had placed the lives of men and the honor of the
nation and do not reflect a will to ratify usurped initiatives. That, however, is
simply a charge of Congressional pusillanimity. Such evidence, and its extent
and validity are not to be supposed, could only disclose the motive and could not
disprove the fact ofauthorization. The Constitution presents the Congress with
the opportunity for it, but it cannot compel the making of unpopular decisions
by the members of Congress....
The place of the controversial Tonkin Gulf Resolution in the whole of
Congressional action is unclear;, its importance no doubt lay in its practical
effect on the presidential initiative rather than its constitutional meaning, but
it has not the compelling significance of the steady legislative support of the
prosecutionof the war.
Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
88. See Corn, PresidentialWar Power,supra note 21.
89. See id. at 251-54.
90. See id91.
[T~he history ofwar-making decisions in the United States demonstrates that,
so long as the actions of Congress reasonably suggest support for the President,
the President may treat such support, even if implied, as authority to execute
such decisions. This practice of relying on "implied consent," which was so
significant for the Vietnam era decisions, is consistent with a broad view of
executive war powers; yet, it plants the foundation for such power not in a
theory of unilateral presidential war power, but in the combined authority of
both political branches, as executed by the President.
Ironically, it is this practice of presidential reliance on the implicit support
of the Congress and not unilateral presidential war making, that is so "long
standing" that it may be considered to represent the proper constitutional
process for making war power decisions. It appears reasonable to conclude that
this practice of executive reliance on the implied support of the legislature
comes much closer to satisfying the "historical gloss" test than the theory that
the executive is now vested with broad unilateral constitutional authority to
wage war.
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related to this analysis, a discussion of the judicial decisions related
to the Vietnam War will serve to illustrate the significance of the
pre-War Power Resolution practice.
Throughout the war in Vietnam, service members ordered to duty
in Southeast Asia turned to the courts to challenge the legality of
their deployment orders.92 In most cases, these challenges were
premised on the assertion that the President lacked the
constitutional authority to order the armed forces to engage in
conflict because Congress had never declared war. In response, the
executive branch consistently asserted a theory of unilateral
executive war power to defeat the challenges, either as
nonjusticiable political questions, or on the merits.9"
Initially, the political question arguments were successful.
Several courts relied on the political question doctrine to dismiss
challenges on the grounds that the decision to go to war is
"textually... commit[ted] to a coordinate political department."94
These courts held that "[tihe fundamental division of authority and
power established by the Constitution precludes judges from
overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition
of military power. "" However, this theory was soon rejected by
other courts as a basis for outright dismissal." Instead of holding
that the decision to initiate and wage war was textually committed
to a coordinate branch of the government, these courts concluded
Id. at 252.
92. See id. at 218-31 (discussing judicial decisions related to the legality of the Vietnam
War).
93. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307,1308-09 (2d Cir. 1973); DaCosta v.
Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147 (2d Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st
Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039,1041 (2d Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302,
304-05 (2d Cir. 1970); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd sub nom.
Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 539-40 (N.D.
Cal. 1970), rev'd. on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); FRIEDMAN & NEUBORNE,
supra note 87, at 23-50; Ratner & Cole, supra note 9, at 727.
94. Bakerv. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1961); see Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236,239 (10th
Cir. 1969); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665-66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (per curium); United
States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511,515 (D. Mass. 1968); Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846,
849-50 (D. Kan. 1968), afl'd sub nom.
95. Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 704 (quoting Luftig, 373 F.2d at 665-66).
96. See, e.g., Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1309; DaCosta,471 F.2d at 1155; Laird, 451 F.2d at
31-34; Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042; Berk, 429 F.2d at 304-06; Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 703-04;
Mottola, 318 F. Supp. at 550-54; FRIEDMAN & NEUBORNE, supranote 87, at 23-50; Ratner &
Cole, supra note 9, at 727.
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the decision was committed to both political branches." These
courts held that "the constitutional delegation of the war-declaring
power to the Congress contains a discoverable and manageable
standard imposing on the Congress a duty of mutual participation
in the prosecution of war."8 Accordingly, the question of whether
Congress had played any role in the decision to wage war was not
a political question, but a classic constitutional question susceptible
to judicial resolution.
These cases, and others echoing the same constitutional
requirement that Congress play a role in war-making decisions,99
substantially undercut the argument that history illustrates the
existence of unilateral presidential war power. There is, however,
another aspect of these decisions that is more relevant to analysis
of the legality of the War Powers Resolution. In every one of the
cases finding ajusticiable issue, the courts ultimately dismissed the
challenge as presenting a nonjusticiable political question.'
Although this may seem contradictory, a closer examination of the
process that led to these decisions illustrates the critical point.
In each case that survived the initial political question
challenge-that is, where the court agreed to hear the question of
whether domestic legal authority existed by virtue of congressional
support-the plaintiffs argued that the orders sending them to
Vietnam were unconstitutional because Congress had not properly
authorized the war.'0 It was this issue that was routinely
dismissed as a political question. The common theme of these
decisions is that while the Constitution requires meaningful
congressional involvement in the decision to wage war, the method
Congress chooses to manifest its support is not mandated by the
Constitution, and is therefore a political question to be worked out
97. See, e.g., Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1312; DaCosta,471 F.2d at 1157; Laird, 451 F.2d at
31-34; Orlando,443 F.2d at 1043-44; Berk, 429 F.2d at 305-06;Atee, 347 F. Supp. at 703-07;
Mottola,318 F. Supp. at 548-54; see also Corn,PresidentialWarPower,supranote 21, at 18696 (discussing the justiciability of war power issues).
98. Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042.
99. See generally Corn, PresidentialWarPower, supranote 21, at 196-238 (detailing the
"analytical framework" of cases arguing that Congress must authorize a decision to go to
war).
100. See Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1309-12; Dacosta,471 F.2d at 1155-57; Orlando,443 F.2d
at 1042-44; Berk, 429 F.2d at 305-06; Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 705-07; see also FRIEDMAN &
NEUBORNE, supranote 87, at 23-50; Ratner & Cole, supra note 9, at 727.
101. See supra note 92-93 and accompanying text.
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between Congress and the President." 2 Thus, Congress's failure to
declare war did not mean the war was automatically unconstitutional. The Courts only required that the evidence demonstrate
congressional support for the war, and therefore a congressional
role in authorizing the war. 3 Once such evidence was adduced,
further inquiry into the propriety of the method used by Congress
was rejected."0 4
102. See sources cited supra note 97. This conclusion was clearly enunciated by the First
Circuit as follows:
As to the power to conduct undeclared hostilities beyond emergency defense,
then, we are inclined to believe that the Constitution, in giving some essential
powers to Congress and others to the executive, committed the matter to both
branches, whose joint concord precludes the judiciary from measuring a specific
executive action against any specific clause in isolation. In arriving at this
conclusion we are aware that while we have addressed the problem of
justiciability in the light of the textual commitment criterion, we have also
addressed the merits of the constitutional issue.
Laird,451 F.2d at 33 (citation omitted). In the last case related to the legality of the Vietnam
War, Justice Marshall also echoed this position:
"[A]s a matter of substantive constitutional law, it seems likely that the
President may not wage war without some form of congressional
approval-except, perhaps, in the case of pressing emergency or when the
President is in the process of extricating himself from a war which Congress
once authorized."
Holtzman, 414 U.S. at 1311-12.
103. In the conclusion to their book on the Berk and Orlando litigation, Leon Friedman
and Burt Neuborne noted that:
[Tihe myth of inherent presidential authority to wage war was utterly
destroyed. The grandiose view of the Executive's inherent power to wage war
was rejected categorically by every judge who passed upon it. The inherentpower argument was so lacking in intellectual justification that it was able to
flourish only in the absence ofjudicial review. As soon as it came under judicial
scrutiny, it was laughed out of court.
... Congress was put on notice that it could no longer avoid its constitutional
responsibilities by abdicating them. Berk and Orlando established without
question thatprimarycongressional responsibilityforwar andpeace was firmly
embedded in the Constitution, and that Congress could not avoid its
responsibilities simply by deferring to the Executive. The cases had established
that congressional involvement in presidentially initiated hostilities was
inevitable-in the form of appropriations bills. Thus, whether Congress wished
it or not, the Berk and Orlando courts had created a Rubicon which future
congressmen would have to cross. No longer could critics of a war be dissuaded
from debating its merits during the'appropriations process by assurances that
paying the bills for a war did not constitute its approval.
FRIEDMAN & NEUBORNE, supranote 87, at 273-74.
104.
[We are inclined to believe that the Constitution, in giving some essential
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This method of assessing the legality of a decision by the
President to initiate and maintain combat operations provides great
flexibility to the political branches. Throughout our history,
congressional support for combat operations covers the spectrum
from explicit authorization to implied consent, including
declarations of war, specific statutes and joint resolutions
authorizing conflicts, raising armed forces to prosecute a conflict, or
funding combat operations, and possibly even merely voting down
measures to stop conflicts.' This point was emphasized by Judge
Judd in the case of Berk v. Laird:
1. From the early days of our republic there has been a
recognized distinction between a "perfect war" or total war,
initiated by a formal declaration of war, and an "imperfect war"
or partial war, which involves military action authorized by
Congress without a formal declaration of war.
2. There is no doubt that Congress has authorized the
President to send members of the armed forces to South
Vietnam to engage in hostilities.
3. The question whether Congress should declare total war or
rely on some other mode of authorizing military action is a
political question.
Having found that Congress authorized the sending of
American troops to Vietnam, the court would be entering the
realm of politics in saying that the authorization should have
been couched in different language.
In the years since World War I, Congress has authorized the
President, by a series of Resolutions, to use the armed forces as
he might deem necessary to protect Formosa and the
Pescadores against armed attack, to assist any nation in the
Middle East requesting assistance against armed communist
aggression, to prevent the "Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba"
from extending its aggressive or subversive activities to any
powers to Congress and others to the executive, committed the matter to both
branches, whosejoint concord precludes the judiciary from measuring a specific
executive action against any specific clause in isolation.
Laird, 451 F.2d at 33.
105. See DoCUMENrsRELATINGTOTHEWARPOWER, supranote 85; WORMUTH&FIRMAGE,

supra note 84, at 336-38; Stromseth, War Powers Today, supranote 6, at 865-86.
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part of this hemisphere, and to prevent any violation by the
Soviet Union of the right of access to Berlin. The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee stated that "the exact line of authority
between the President and Congress" had been "in doubt for the
past 160 years."
... Congress may use a variety of methods in authorizing
military activities .... o"
Thus, the "executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
the Congress and never before questioned"0 7 has been to rely on a
variety of manifestations of congressional support, or any combination thereof, to conclude that a decision to engage in conflict is
supported by the legislature.
It is also important to note the relationship between this flexible
model for manifesting constitutionally mandated support for a
President and nonjusticiability doctrines that courts have used to
dismiss challenges to presidential exercise of war powers. In the
two most recent cases addressing presidential war powers, Dellums
v. Bush and Campbell v. Clinton, federal courts relied upon the
ripeness doctrine and the legislative standing doctrine, respectively,
as grounds for dismissal."0 8 In analyzing these decisions in previous
articles, I illustrated how the existence of some evidence of
congressional support was the sine qua non to application of these
doctrines.' In those cases, application ofnonjusticiability doctrines
was contingent on the conclusion that there was no conflict between
the position of the Congress and the actions of the President."0
Thus, although not explicitly stating so, these cases also reflect an
106. Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Memorandum and Order Granting
Summary Judgment for Defendants), reprintedin FRIEDMAN & NEUBORNE, supra note 87,
at 116-26.
107. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,610 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
108. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 1141, 1149-52 (D.D.C. 1990).
109. See Corn, PresidentialWar Power, supra note 21, at 231-38 (analyzing Dellums v.
Bush); Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Campbell v. Clinton, The 'Implied Consent" Theory of
PresidentialWar Power is Again Validated, 161 MIL. L. REv. 202, 207 (1999) [hereinafter
Corn, Implied Consent Theory].
110. See Corn, PresidentialWar Power,supra note 21, at 231-38; Corn, Implied Consent
Theory, supranote 109, at 213-14 (referring to a lack of "impasse" between Congress and the
President).
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endorsement of the flexible support theory of authorizing military
operations, and the permissibility ofpresidential reliance upon such
support.
PART IH: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE REJECTION OF
THE FLEXIBLE SUPPORT THEORY OF WAR POWERS

In 1973, at the height of the Watergate investigation and in the
aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress mustered the will to
finally prevail over a presidential veto. 1 ' That veto override vote
resulted in the War Powers Resolution, which has become the
subject of intense scholarly debate." 2 In practice, however, although
it would be an overstatement to assert that the War Powers
Resolution has had no significance, it certainly has not had the
impact the enacting Congress intended."' The Resolution's failure
to achieve its stated purpose is most dramatic with regards to the
type of legislative authority necessary for the initiation of combat
operations.
The War Powers Resolution has several components, but its core
purpose is to prevent the President from ordering the initiation of
combat operations absent the express consent of Congress. To this
end, the Resolution states that:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization,or (3) a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces." 4

As is clear from this language, with the exception of an emergency
response to an attack against the United States or its armed forces,
the Resolution purports to prohibit the initiation of any other
111. See Fisher & Adler, supranote 8, at 4.
112. See, e.g., id. at 8; Glennon, supra note 10; Rolph, supranote 13; Turner, supranote
13; Vance, supranote 9.
113. See Fisher & Adler, supranote 8, at 16-18.
114. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
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combat operation by the President until express congressional
authorization for the operation is obtained. This prohibition clearly
contradicts the flexible mode of congressional participation in the
decision to conduct combat operations validated by the Vietnam-Era
decisions.11 5 Thus, it appears that Congress was attempting to
preempt future presidential reliance on the type of implied support
held constitutionally sufficient by these cases. This conclusion is
further validated by Section 1547, Interpretation of Joint
Resolution:
Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be inferred (1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect
before November 7, 1973), including any provision
contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provision
specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and
states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory
authorization within the meaning of this chapter." 6
The War Powers Resolution is clear: Only express legislative
support for combat operations may be regarded as constitutionally
sufficient.
PART IV: POST-RESOLUTION PRACTICE AND THE CONTINUED
VALIDATION OF THE FLEXIBLE AUTHORIZATION THEORY
Since 1973, there have been arguably eleven combat operations
conducted at the direction of the President: Mayaguez, the Iran
hostage rescue mission, Lebanon, Grenada, protection of Persian
Gulf shipping, the air strikes against Libya, Panama, Somalia, the
Persian Gulf War,1 17 Operation Desert Fox, and Operation Allied
115. See supra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.
116. 50 U.S.C. § 1547 (emphasis added).
117. I include Operations Northern and Southern Watch-the continuing enforcement of
no-fly zones in Iraq-within the scope ofthe Persian Gulf War because of the U.S. view that
these operations stem from the same authorizations, domestic and international, that
authorized the conflict. See Michael N. Schmitt, Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-fly
Zone Rules ofEngagement,20 Loy. L.A. INTL& Comp. L.J. 727,733-37 (1998) (discussing the

20011

FINAL DESTRUCTION OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

1175

Force."' Of these eleven, only three-Mayaguez, the Iran hostage
rescue mission, and Panama-can be categorized as responses to an
attack on U.S. territory or its armed forces." 9 Contrary to the
stated purpose of the War Powers Resolution, however, only
one-the Persian Gulf War-was preceded by express statutory
authorization,' 0 and only two others-the Lebanon mission' and
Operation Restore Hope in SomaliaM2 -- received such authorization
after initiation.
Each of these operations contributes to the landscape of post-War
Powers Resolution history for review in analyzing the existence of
constitutional authority to order combat operations. In each of these
operations, the President who ordered the use of force did so based
on a theory of unilateral executive authority.' The circumstances
surrounding these operations, however, also reflect a continued
application of the flexible model for authorizing combat operations.
argument that, although U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, commonly cited as the basis
for the no-fly zones, does not explicitly authorize affirmative enforcement action, Resolution
678's endorsement of the use of force to bring Iraq into compliance with U.N. resolutions
covers subsequent resolutions, including 688).
118. I do not include within this list the 1998 air strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan
following the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These operations can
arguably be characterized as acts of preemptive self-defense rather than nondefensive
combat operations, and therefore within the Executive's vested authority. See Steven Lee
Myers, U.S. Says Raids Worked and may Stall TerrorAttacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,1998, at
Al ("Despite the risks, the Administration defended the strikes; citing the nation's right, as
defined in the United Nations Charter, to defend itself."); supra note 21 and accompanying
text (discussing the constitutional difference between defensive and nondefensive combat
operations).
119. An argument can be made that operations to protect Persian Gulf shipping were
responses to attacks against U.S. territory under the theory that a flag ship is the territory
ofthe flag state forpurposes of determiningprescriptive jurisdiction under international law.
See, eg., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571,585 (1953) (noting, in the context of determining
criminal jurisdiction over personnel of a merchant ship: "[t~his Court has said that the law
of the flag supersedes the territorial principle.., because it is deemed to be a part of the
territory of that sovereignty [whose flag it flies], and not to lose that character when in
navigable waters within the territorial limits of another sovereignty" (third alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-59 (1933) and citing In re The
S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9)).
120. See Authorizationfor Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 1021, 105 Stat. 3, 3-4 (1991), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note at 175-176 (1994).
121. See Ratner & Cole, supra note 9, at 745-49.
122. See 139 Cong. Rec. H274 (daily ed. May 25, 1993).
123. See Stromseth, War PowersToday, supranote 6, at 878-909 (discussing the asserted
legal bases for several contemporary combat operations).
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Unfortunately for proponents of either theory of constitutional
power, until 1999, the analytical value of each operation was
undercut by one critical factor: time.
Under the War Powers Resolution,
Within sixty calendar days... the President shall terminate
any use of United States Armed Forces... unless Congress (1)
has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for
such use of United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by
law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as
a result of an armed attack upon the United States."
Some commentators have argued that the sixty-day clock allows the
President to conduct offensive military operations for up to sixty
days without obtaining authorization." Regardless, prior to 1999,
no operation exceeded this sixty-day"twilight zone" without a grant
of express congressional authorization."n Thus, proponents of
unilateral executive power could assert that these operations
validate their claim, only to be countered with the argument that
they were merely applications of an inadvertent or implied grant of
limited authority to the President through the War Powers
Resolution.12 This landscape has now changed.
In March of 1999, President Clinton ordered the initiation of air
and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.12
His stated purpose was to force the Yugoslavian government to
accept the presence of NATO forces in the province of Kosovo.' 2 9 No
U.S. territory or armed forces had been attacked, nor had Congress
granted authority for the operation. In his message to Congress,
President Clinton asserted that the operation was constitutional
based on his authority as Chief Executive and Commander in
Chief. 13 0
Not long thereafter, a member of Congress, Representative Tom
Campbell, announced his intent to invoke the War Powers
124. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994).
125. See, e.g., Fisher & Adler, supra note 8, at 1.
126. See id. at 10-12.

127. See id. at 16-17.
128. See Letter to Congressional Leaders, supra note 86, at 527-28.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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Resolution to force an up or down vote in Congress on providing
express authorization for the combat operations. 3 ' The failure of
Congress to grant such express authority led Representative
Campbell and other members of Congress to seek a judgment from
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
declaring the war unconstitutional." 2 His primary basis for the
challenge was that the Constitution required prior express
authorization from Congress.' He also invoked the War Powers
Resolution on the theory that, should the conflict persist, even the
sixty-day argument would not save the President from judgment,
because the clock
had expired without specific statutory
M

authorization.1

Immediately after this announcement, Representative Campbell
introduced two pieces of legislation related to the war.' The first
was a declaration of war. This was defeated by a vote of 427 to 2.11
The second was a resolution demanding the immediate termination

131. See Press Release, Statement by Congressman Campbell on Kosovo, at http:l/www.
house.gov/campbell/990324.htm (Mar. 24, 1999):
Under the provisions of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, passed over
President Nixon's veto, the President is obliged sixty days after "United States
Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement of hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," or ninety
days thereafter under very limited circumstances, to withdraw those forces
"unless the Congress has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization
for such use of United States Armed Forces." If President Clinton fails to follow
that statutory requirement, then it is in order for any Member of Congress to
introduce a resolution to compel the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
I will introduce such a resolution sixty days from today, unless the President
has by then withdrawn U.S. forces from hostilities in and around Kosovo, orhas
obtained the permission of Congress to keep them there.
132. See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39-40 (D.D.C. 1999); Press Release,
Congressman Campbell Files Lawsuit to Reassert Congress' Constitutional War Power
Authority, at http'J/www.house.gov/campbelY990427.htm (Apr. 30,1999) [hereinafter Press
Release, Campbell Files Lawsuit].
133. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 39; Press Release, Campbell Files Lawsuit, supra
note 132.
134. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 39.
135. See Press Release, Whetherfor or Against MilitaryAction in Kosovo, Congress Must
Exercise its Constitutional War Powers Authority, at http'J/www.house.gov/campbelW
990414.htm (Apr. 13, 1999).
136. See Campbellv. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19,20 (D.C. Cir. 2000); H.R.J. Res. 44,106th Cong.
(1999); 145 CONG. REC. H2427-41 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
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of the operation. This was also defeated in the House. l" 7 On the
same day, however, the House voted on a concurrent resolution
authorizing continued air and missile strikes against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which failed to pass by a vote of 213 to
213.138 By forcing these votes, Representative Campbell set the
stage for his lawsuit. As the conflict surpassed the sixty-day mark,
he could assert, for the first time in the history of the War Powers
Resolution, that not only had the Constitution been violated, but
there was no plausible argument 3 that
the conflict was consistent
9
with the War Powers Resolution.

In response to the lawsuit filed by Campbell and his colleagues,
the President argued that the case was a political question. 4" This
argument was quickly avoided by the court.'4 Instead, the district
court dismissed the challenge on the basis that the plaintiffs lacked
legislative standing.'42 Applying the standard set forth in Raines v.
Byrd, 43 the district court required Campbell to allege "personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."' Under Raines,
legislative standing is established where legislators' votes are
"completely nullified" by an executive act,'45 or "virtually held for
naught."'46 This, in turn, requires a "true 'constitutional impasse'"
between the President and Congress. 47 In Campbell, the evidence
137. See Campbell,203 F.3d. at 20; H.R. Con. Res. 82,106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG. REC.
H2414-27 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
138. See Campbell,203 F.3d at 20 (2000); S. Con. Res. 21, 106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG.
REC. H2441-52 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1999).
139. See Corn, Implied Consent Theory, supra note 109, at 203-04.
140. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 39; Corn, Implied Consent Theory, supra note 109,
at 205-06.
141. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 40 & n.5; Corn, Implied ConsentTheory, supranote
109, at 212-13. The district court did not actually reach the political question issue, although
the judge "went out of his way to reject the per-se application of the doctrine espoused by the
Justice Department." Corn, Implied Consent Theory, supranote 109, at 213. "To the extent
that the President is arguing that every case brought by a legislator alleging a violation of
the War Powers Clause raises a nonjusticiable political question, he is wrong." Campbell, 52
F. Supp. 2d at 40 n.5.
142. See Campbell,52 F. Supp. 2d at 41-45; Corn,Implied ConsentTheory, supranote 109,
at 209-12.
143. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
144. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 41 (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 818).
145. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 823; Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
146. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939); Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
147. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the
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of continued congressional support for the conflict, manifested
in the defeat of the resolution calling for an immediate termination
of operations and by the continued funding of those operations,
was the key to the decision.' According to the district court,
"[c] ongressional reaction to the air strikes has sent distinctly mixed
messages, and that congressional equivocation undermines
plaintiffs' argument that there is a direct conflict between the
branches."'49 Having dismissed the case for lack of standing, the
district court failed to address Representative Campbell's claim
that the President had violated the War Powers Resolution.' 50
Based on its failure to address the War Powers Resolution, the
plaintiffs appealed the decision of the district court. Although the
conflict had already been terminated, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granted the appeal and on February
18, 2000, issued its opinion." The D.C. Circuit upheld the action of
the district court, and agreed that the case was barred by the
doctrine of legislative standing.'52 Unlike the district court opinion,
however, the D.C. Circuit addressed head-on the applicability ofthe
War Powers Resolution.153 In three separate opinions, each judge
came to the conclusion that the dismissal was proper. 4 Although
each judge focused on a slightly different theory to support his
conclusion, all shared a common theme: The continued evidence of
implied support from the Congress throughout the conflict was
sufficient to satisfy all legal requirements, the War Powers
Resolution notwithstanding. 155 Thus, the congressmen lacked
standing to challenge the war, even based on the War Powers
Resolution, because the lack of express opposition from the
Congress meant that they could not assert that any of their votes
judgment); Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
148. See Campbell, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 43-45; Corn, Implied ConsentTheory, supranote 109,
at 209-12.
149. Campbell, 52 F. Supp. at 44.
150. See Corn, Implied Consent Theory, supranote 109, at 213-14.
151. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
152. See id. at 20-24.
153. See id. at 22-23.
154. See id. at 20-24 (Silberman, J., delivering the opinion of the court); id. at 28-33
(Randolph, J., concurring); id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring).
155. See id. at 22-23 (Silberman, J., delivering the opinion of the court); id. at 28-33
(Randolph, J., concurring); iaL at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring). Regarding Judge Randolph's
opinion, see infra note 159.
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had been nullified by the President. According to the opinion of the
court:
Here the plaintiff congressmen, by specifically defeating the
War Powers Resolution authorization by a tie vote and by
defeating a declaration of war, sought to fit within the Coleman
exception to the Raines rule [to the legislative standing barrier].
This parliamentary tactic led to an extensive argument before
us as to exactly what the Supreme Court meant by a claim that
a legislator's vote was completely "nullified."
• . . As the government correctly observes, appellants'
statutory argument, although cast in terms of the nullification
of a recent vote, essentially is that the President violated the
quarter-century old War Powers Resolution. Similarly, their
constitutional argument is that the President has acted
illegally-in excess of his authority-because he waged war in
the constitutional sense without a congressional delegation.
Neither claim is analogous to a Colemannullification [referring
to the type of vote nullification required to trigger the Coleman
v. Miller1" exception to the bar against legislator standing
established by the Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd.15].
We think the key to understanding the Court's treatment of
Coleman and its use of the word nullification is its implicit
recognition that a ratification vote on a constitutional
amendment is an unusual situation. It is not at all clear
whether once the amendment was "deemed ratified," the
Kansas Senate could have done anything to reverse that
position.... In other words, they had no legislative remedy.
Under that reading-which we think explains the very narrow
possible Coleman exception to Raines-appellants fail because
they continued, after the votes, to enjoy ample legislative power
to have stopped prosecution of the "war."
In this case, Congress certainly could have passed a law
forbidding the use of U.S. forces in the Yugoslav campaign;
indeed, there was a measure-albeit only a concurrent
resolution-introduced to require the President to withdraw
U.S. troops. Unfortunately, however, for those congressmen
who, like appellants, desired an end to U.S. involvement in
Yugoslavia, this measure was defeated by a 139 to 290 vote. 5 8
156. 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
157. 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997).
158. Campbell, 203 F.3d at 22-23.
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Although based on the doctrine of legislative standing, Campbell
must also be viewed as an endorsement of the "implied consent"
theory of constitutional war powers.' 9 The indication that Congress
at all times retained the power to terminate the combat operations
against Yugoslavia, even potentially with a concurrent resolution,
must be viewed as a rejection of the "inherent executive war power"
argument. Instead, the court clearly focused on the fact that
Congress had not only declined to explicitly oppose the operation,
but had even sent signals of support to the President, both in the
form of emergency appropriations and the defeat of the resolution
calling for the immediate termination of combat operations. Thus,
once again, from a constitutional standpoint it was more significant

159. Admittedly, Judge Randolph's opinion is the least explicit on this point. On
Campbell's constitutional claim that the President nullified their defeat of a declaration of
war, Judge Randolph noted that:
The vote against declaring war followed immediately upon the vote not to
require immediate withdrawal Those who voted against a declaration of war
did so to deprive the President of the authority to expand hostilities beyond the
bombingcampaign and, specifically, to deprive him ofthe authority to introduce
ground troops into the conflict.
Id. at 30-31 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgement). Randolph's statement appears to
be premised on a rule that offensive combat operations can be initiated with congressional
authorization short ofa declaration ofwar. On Campbell's statutory claim that the President
violated the War Powers Resolution, however, Judge Randolph rejected the majority's
reliance on Congress's decision to continue to authorize funding for Operation Allied Force,
noting that the funding could not satisfy the express authorization requirements of the War
Powers resolution, and that Congress "may pass such legislation, not because it is in favor
of continuing the hostilities, but because it does not want to endanger soldiers in the field."
Id at 32 n.10. According to Randolph, the majority "confused the right to vote in the future
with the nullification of a vote in the past." Id. at 32. Instead, Randolph argued that the
"legislative action" Campbell had voted against did not go "into effect":
Congressional authorization simply did not occur. The President may have
acted as if he had Congress's approval, or he may have acted as if he did not
need it. Either way, plaintiffs' real complaint is not that the President ignored
their votes; it is that he ignored the War Powers Resolution, and hence the
votes of an earlier Congress, which enacted the law over President Nixon's veto.
Id at 31. Under Randolph's logic, no legislative standing will ever exist so long as "the
President never maintain[s] that he [is] prosecuting the war with the House's approval."Id.
at 29. Accordingly, anything short of a conflict between an affirmative vote to demand the
cessation of an operation will fail to secure legislative standing, thereby obviating the War
Powers Resolution's automatic termination provision. See infra text accompanying note 160.
This is the most extreme example of implied consent, and the conclusion that Congress can
authorize conflict with something other than a declaration is consistent with the entire
history of judicial review of war making.
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that Congress seemed to be supporting the President implicitly
than that Congress had failed to do so explicitly.
What makes Campbell so profound under this analysis is that the
court did not treat the War Powers Resolution, with its requirement
for express legislative authority, as a bar to the conclusion that the
legislators lacked standing. Thus, the implied support of the
Congress in session during Operation Allied Force took precedence
over the mandate of a Congress that sat twenty-seven years earlier.
In the words of Judge Randolph:
The President may have acted as if he had Congress's approval,
or he may have acted as if he did not need it. Either way,
plaintiffs real complaint is not that the President ignored their
votes; it is that he ignored the War Powers Resolution, and
hence the votes of an earlier Congress, which enacted the law
over President Nixon's veto. It is hard for me to see that this
amounts to anything more than saying: "We, the members of
Congress, have standing because the President violated one of
our laws." To hold that Members of Congress may litigate on
such a basis strikes me as highly problematic, not only because
the principle is unconfined but also because it raises very
serious separation-of-powers concerns."o
Thus, once again, and this time in the face of an apparent violation
of the War Powers Resolution, the implied consent theory of war
power was confirmed. As in so many prior incidents involving the
use of force, the President took initiative, Congress, at worse,
acquiesced, or at best, implicitly supported the initiative, and a
court, although acknowledging Congress's ability to take affirmative action to restrain the President, concluded that the
President had not violated the Constitution through his action.
PART V: AN ALTERNATE CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK ON THE WAR
POWERS RESOLUTION
When President Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution, 6 ' he
noted several components of the Resolution that he believed to be

160. Id. at 31 (Randolph, J., concurring).
161. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supranote 3.
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unconstitutional. One objectionable component was the mandate
that:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commandei-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization,or (3) a national emergency created by attack
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces. 62
According to the President, this mandate violated the
Constitution by intruding upon the unilateral constitutional power
of the President to commit U.S. forces to combat.163 With the
exception of acknowledging the power of the President to respond
to attacks on the United States or its armed forces, the Resolution
indisputably restricts the power of the President to order U.S.
armed forces into combat. The argument that the Act is
unconstitutional because it impermissibly intrudes upon the
President's inherent and unilateral authority, however, is
disputable. In fact, the validity of this argument has been the focus
of the bulk of writing related to the Resolution.16 Whether the
President has unilateral or inherent constitutional authority to
order combat operations outside the scope of response to attack
remains unresolved. I believe the quoted provision was, and
remains unconstitutional today, however, because of an alternate
theory.
Since the inception of the Republic, presidents have been
ordering the U.S. armed forces into combat. 6 ' The vast majority of
these operations have not been preceded by express congressional
authorization, and most could not properly be categorized as
1 66
responding to attacks on the United States or its armed forces.
162. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
163. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supranote 3.
164. See, e.g., Ford, supranote 12; Glennon, supranote 10; Ides, supranote 12; Ratner &
Cole, supra note 9; Zablocki, supra note 12; Rushkoff, supra note 12; Spaid, supra note 12.
165. See WORmIIT&FIIMIAGE, supranote 84, at 145-51; Monaghan, supranote 84, at 2531.
166. For a discussion of military operations undertaken without congressional
authorization, see ELY, supra note 83, KOH, supra note 15, and Corn, PresidentialWar

1184

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1149

However, no operation has ever been conducted contrary to the
express will of Congress, and some evidence of implied
congressional support for the President has always existed.16 7 As
the cases arisingfrom the conflict in Vietnam indicate, although the
Constitution requires congressional support, the manner in which
Congress chooses to manifest that support is a political decision left
to the two political branches and is not subject to judicial review. 6 '
Later cases dismissing war power challenges based on the ripeness
or standing doctrines reflected the same fundamental conclusion:
that Congress is free to choose the means to support war-making
initiatives, and the President is justified in relying on implied
congressional support.169
This history satisfies the historical gloss requirement established
by Justice Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
and validated by Justice Rehnquist in Dames & Moore v. Regan.7
Executive reliance on implied manifestations of support for warmaking initiatives thus amounts to
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the
Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of
the structure of our government, [which] may be treated as a
gloss on "executive Power" vested in the President by § 1 of Art.
11.171

As I have demonstrated in previous articles, this conclusion
provides a foundation for numerous judicial decisions sustaining
the exercise of war power by presidents.' 7 2 Although none of these
cases explicitly cited historical gloss as the basis for decision, they
Power,supra note 21.
167. See Corn, PresidentialWar Power, supranote 21, at 244.
168. See supra notes 81-110 and accompanying text.

169. See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
1141 (D.D.C. 1990); see also Corn, PresidentialWarPower, supra note 21 (discussing cases

dealing with Presidential war power authority); Corn, Implied Consent Theory, supra note
109 (discussing Campbell).
170. See supra notes 27-80 and accompanying text.

171. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
172. See Corn,PresidentialWar Power, supranote 21, at 214-15; Corn, Implied Consent
Theory, supra note 109, at 236-38.
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remain extremely relevant. This is because they implicitly validate
presidential reliance on virtually any manifestation of support from
Congress. The clear tenor of the message these cases send to the
executive branch is that nonjusticiability doctrines enable the
President to take and sustain war-making initiatives when
Congress is on notice of the action and declines to act in opposition
to it. In the inverse, the President can initiate action and continue
to prosecute action when Congress continues to express some
support, either express or implied, for the action.
This pattern of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence,
and judicial abstention has been identified by one prominent war
powers scholar as the "operational code of competence." 73 In a short
but pragmatic article, Professor Reisman analyzed the practice of
war making from a de facto perspective, irrespective of the de jure
legitimacy of the "code." Accordingly, he noted:
Behind the legal bickering, a complex, but unstated, operational
code has developed, allocating competence to initiate, direct and
terminate different types of coercion among the branches.
A .constitutional
common law developed early with regard to
the use of force short of war. The President used the military
instrument at his disposal in a variety of settings in which war
had not been declared and for which the Senate or Congress as
a whole had not voted specific authorization .... Congress, as
a whole, rather than being an obstacle and competitor to the
Executive's expanded role in foreign policy, was often
accommodating and compliant. That trend was matched and
validated by the judiciary.
The following propositions reflect, in my view, the
expectations of effective actors, domestic and foreign, about the
way national competence to use force is distributed.
1. War, in its traditional international legal and
constitutional sense, may only be declared by Congress. The
operational code assigns preponderant power to the Executive
for the initiation of action but, in comparison with the past,
somewhat greater power to Congress in its implementation and
termination.
173. W. Michael Reisman, War Powers:The OperationalCode of Competence, 83 AM. J.
INT'LL. 777 (1989).
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2. Reactive nuclear war is a matter of presidential
competence....
3. Other overt military actions short of national war are
matters of initialpresidential competence, subject to a condition
subsequent: continuing congressional political support.
4. As regards low-level, protracted ground operations
requiring repeated congressional allocations, Congress will
enjoy broader power in defining their scope, somewhat less in
their termination and virtually none in their initiation.17 4
Professor Reisman avoids attributing legal significance to his
"code of competence." Yet the same history that leads him to his
conclusions also supports the existence of a constitutional gloss of
authority in the area of war making. While some scholars attempt
to downplay the legal significance of this history, as Professor
Reisman illustrates, it is a history that has led to a pragmatic
understanding and exercise of war power under the Constitution.
The continuation of this pattern during Operation Allied Force
provides powerful support for the argument that this history
creates a constitutional gloss. As demonstrated above, this
operation has an even more profound impact on such an analysis
because of the apparent conflict between the authority for the
President to conduct the operation and the express terms of the
War Powers Resolution.1 7 5
CONCLUSION
As noted above, President Clinton did not assert a historical gloss
of relying upon the implied consent of the Congress in support of his
executive authority to order the initiation of Operation Allied Force.
Instead, he cited the independent authority of the President as
Commander in Chief and Chief Executive as the legal basis to
support his action, and argued that Representative Campbell's
lawsuit presented a nonjusticiable political question.7 6 In so doing,
President Clinton followed a pattern that has been occurring since
the end ofWorld War II. This certainly seems to be the conventional
approach taken by White House lawyers providing legal support for
174. Id. at 777-83 (citations omitted).
175. See supra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 130, 140.
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presidential combat initiatives, 7 7 an approach enjoyingthe support
of strong proponents of such a theory of executive authority.
I believe, however, that a historical gloss theory of legitimate
reliance onimplied congressional support is more defensible for two
primary reasons. First, as illustrated above, it is supported by
history-history derived from the kind of precise analysis Justice
Frankfurter demonstrated was essential to claiming the existence
of such a gloss. 78 This history, and particularly the fact that it has
continued even after the enactment of the War Powers Resolution,
establishes the unconstitutional nature of that Act's provisions
prohibiting future Congresses from implicitly supporting combat
initiatives, and future Presidents from relying on such support. In
contrast, precision historical analysis fails to support the existence
of inherent or unilateral executive power to conduct such military
operations. While there have been many examples of Presidents
asserting such power, the critical missing element is a validation or
ratification of an assertion in the face of express congressional
opposition. 179 Only such an example would clearly demonstrate the
existence of a unilateral executive power. As numerous judicial
decisions have illustrated, there is virtually no support for such a
proposition."'8 It is a fair assertion that some evidence of
congressional support for presidential war-making initiatives has
been the key
element in every case legally sustaining such
8'
initiatives.'
177. See Stromseth, War Powers Today, supra note 6, at 872-75.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 43-50.
179. See Corn, PresidentialWar Power, supra note 21, at 244; Stromseth, War Powers
Today, supra note 6, at 876-77.
180. See generally Corn, PresidentialWar Power, supra note 21, at 205-38 (discussing
cases since 1800).
181. See id. at 244-46. It is interesting to note that even one of the strongest proponents
of executive war power, Professor Robert Turner, seems to acknowledge that such power is
not independent in the sense that it would not withstand express congressional opposition.
In his article War and the ForgottenExecutive Power Clauseof the Constitution:A Review
Essay of John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility, Professor Turner, in a discussion of the
original intent of the Framers of the Constitution, indicates that:
the power to declare war vested in Congress by the Constitution is limited in
scope and pertains only to the authorization of such offensive initiation of
military force as would have required a formal declaration of war at the time
the Constitution was drafted. It was, in essence, an additional safeguard to
prevent the Conmanderin Chieffrom endangering the lives of America's youth
and the solvency of the national treasury by launching painful and costly wars
over political, diplomatic, or economic grievances or from a belief that
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The second reason why a historical gloss theory of executive warmaking authority based on reliance on implied congressional
support is beneficial is because of what it does not purport to do:
disable Congress. Unlike an assertion of independent or unilateral
executive war-making authority, such a theory in no way can be
interpreted as disabling Congress from the war-making process.
Indeed, by making evidence of congressional support the sine qua
non for a constitutionally valid executive initiative, the role of
Congress is clearly confirmed. Unlike the War Powers Resolution,
however, Congress retains the prerogative to decide exactly how to
manifest such support, and the President is permitted to rely on
implied manifestations. As Professor Reisman noted, this modus
operandi is consistent with over two centuries of war-making
practice.'82 This history proves that an implied consent methodology
is not only practicable, but constitutional. As such, it was not
effectively trumped by the War Powers Resolution. Any doubt as to
this assertion was finally settled when President Clinton and the
Congress, in direct contravention of the War Powers Resolution,
once again reverted to this modus operandi during Operation Allied
Force. The refusal by reviewing courts to condemn this practice only
added to its significance.
The conclusion that the history of war making establishes a
constitutional gloss vestingthe President with the authority to rely
upon the implied consent of the Congress as evidence of requisite
support for war-making initiatives may not be popular with
proponents of congressional power. Concededly, such an approach
envisions a certain degree of ambiguity as to what constitutes
geographic expansion by military conquest would serve the people's interests.
Each House of Congress was given a "veto" over such a decision as a part of our
unique system of checks and balances.
Robert F. Turner, War and the ForgottenExecutive Power Clause of the Constitution:A
Review Essay of JohnHartEly's War and Responsibility, 34 VA. J. INTL L. 903, 914 (1994).
In a footnote describing what is meant by the term "veto" in the preceding quotation,
Professor Turner indicated that "[ilt was common in the early period to describe the
congressional power to declare war and the Senate's role in blocking diplomatic
appointments and treaties as 'negatives' or vetoes.' This is useful conceptually to emphasize
that the initiative in all of these matters was to be with the executive." Id. at 914 n.52. This
explanation seems to indicate that ProfessorTurneracknowledges that express congressional
opposition to executive war-making initiative would disable the President. If this is the case,
then it is hard to reconcile such a theory with an assertion of independent or unilateral
executive war-making authority.
182. See Reisman, supranote 173, at 781-83.
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sufficient support for an operation. The key, however, is that
history demonstrates that ambiguity of this nature weighs in favor
of the President. Thus, such an approach is both pragmatic and
consistent with the doctrine of checks and balances, for it preserves
for the Congress the power to play a decisive role in war-making
policy. Such a role, however, requires affirmative congressional
action. It is perhaps fitting to close this Article with a quote from
Judge Dooling's decision in Orlando v. Laird, a case involving a
challenge to the constitutional authority of the President to order
the deployment of a soldier to the conflict in Southeast Asia. 83
Judge Dooling reminds us that Congress is never a victim of this
theory, but a knowing participant:
It is passionately argued that none of the acts of the Congress
which have furnished forth the sinew of war in levying taxes,
appropriating the nation's treasure and conscripting its
manpower in order to continue the Vietnam conflict can amount
to authorizing the combat activities because the Constitution
contemplates express authorization takenwithout the coercions
exerted by illicit seizures of the initiative by the presidency. But
it is idle to suggest that the Congress is so little ingenious or so
inappreciative of its powers, including the power of
impeachment, that it cannot seize policy and action initiatives
at will, and halt course of action from which it wishes the
national power to be withdrawn. Political expediency may have
counseled the Congress's choice of the particular forms and
modes bywhich it has united with the presidency in prosecuting
the Vietnam combat activities, but the reality of the
collaborative action of the executive and the legislative required
by the Constitution has been present from the earliest stages." 4
Operation Allied Force represents conclusive proof that Judge
Dooling's vision of the constitutional significance of implied
congressional support for presidential combat initiatives remains
valid today. The War Powers Resolution purports to limit the
constitutional significance ofsuch implied support, and the operable
provisions designed to accomplish that purpose themselves
contradict the deeply embedded modus operandi for cooperative
183. 317 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
184. Id. at 1019.
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war-making decisions. The War Powers Resolution is therefore an
unconstitutional attempt to restrict future Congresses from
supporting executive initiatives with something less than express
authorization. More importantly, it is an impermissible restriction
on the constitutional right of future presidents to rely upon such
implied support or consent as a basis to conclude that war-making
initiatives enjoy constitutionally requisite support.
As demonstrated above, this practice of implied-consent-based
war making has continued ever since the passage of the War
Powers Resolution. Only with Operation Allied Force, however, did
the conflict between the continued use of this modus operandi and
the War Powers Resolution become absolutely irreconcilable. The
President took the initiative, the conflict was not defensive or
responsive, and the Congress, although providing implied support,
declined to expressly authorize the operation, which exceeded the
sixty-day "twilight-zone" established by the War Powers Resolution.
When the case reached the courts, as in past cases, evidence of
congressional support proved to be the ultimate barrier to
justiciability, in spite of the War Powers Resolution. Thus, the preResolution practice of the President relying on the implied support
of Congress, Congress allowing the President to take war-making
initiatives and manifesting its consent through less than express
authorization, and courts declining to intervene so long as such
support was evident, was reconfirmed. This course of action stands
as powerful proof that this historical practice was no accident, but
a reflection of the proper constitutional process for making war.
This practice provides the political branches of the government with
the flexibility needed to make decisions in such a realm, and gives
Congress the ever-present ability to affirmatively assert its power
under the Constitution to alter the course of action selected by the
President.

